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Intelligent vehicles are advancing at a fast speed with the improvement of automation and connectivity, which
opens up new possibilities for different cyber-attacks, including in-vehicle attacks (e.g., hijacking attacks) and
vehicle-to-everything communicationattacks (e.g., data theft). These problems are becoming increasingly serious
with the development of 4G LTE and 5G communication technologies. Although many efforts are made to
improve the resilience to cyber attacks, there are still many unsolved challenges. This paper first identifies some
major security attacks on intelligent connected vehicles. Then, we investigate and summarize the available de-
fences against these attacks and classify them into four categories: cryptography, network security, software
vulnerability detection, and malware detection. Remaining challenges and future directions for preventing attacks
on intelligent vehicle systems have been discussed as well.1. Introduction
The past decade has seen a rapid development of vehicular systems in
various aspects. The complexity of current vehicular systems, with a
dramatic increase in the use of electronic systems and wireless technol-
ogies, has changed the traditional concept of security in the automotive
industry. Moreover, the growing interest in the development of vehicular
networks and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) has introduced
new security challenges and vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, long-established
computer security policies are not followed by the industry standards for
in-vehicle and vehicular communications because of hardware con-
straints and differences in network configuration [1,2].
Previous reports have illustrated highly practical wireless attacks on
core functions of vehicles, which can disengage engines and brakes
[3–6]. For instance, by hijacking the steering and braking units in a Ford
Escape and a Toyota Prius, Miller and Valasek [3] found that while a
vehicle system is getting more advanced with appealing features, the
system is also becoming a vulnerable target for attacks. In 2015, 1.4
million vehicles were subjects of a recall by Chrysler because hackers
could remotely take control of a jeep’s digital system over the InternetDibaei), james.zheng@mq.edu.a
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acks and defences on intelligen[4]. In another report, a team of hackers remotely hijacked a Tesla Model
S from a distance of 12 miles [5]. In a recent study, researchers have
found 14 vulnerabilities in the infotainment system in several Bavarian
Motor Works (BMW) series [6]. Overall, these incidents proved that se-
curity in intelligent vehicular systems has become essential and must be
treated with high priority.
At present, successful cybersecurity attacks on vehicles are mainly
caused by information sharing and wireless communications. Conse-
quently, information privacy, data privacy, securing data exchange,
including input and output data as well as protecting Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) inside the vehicle systems, are among the most significant
security and privacy issues for intelligent vehicles [7].
In this paper, we encompass security with attacks, defences, and vul-
nerabilities.With this as the scope,we sortedout themost significant recent
work related to our study and that these works are limited in attacks or
vulnerabilities, but they donot focus toomuch on defencemechanisms. For
instance,Mokhtar andAzab[8],Sakiz andSen[9], andHasrounyetal. [10].
have focused on security attacks onVehicular AdhocNETworks (VANETs).
In these papers, however, security defence mechanisms have not been
classifiedexplicitly.Moreover, although these studieshaveperformedsomeu (X. Zheng), jiangkun@tsinghua.edu.cn (K. Jiang), robert.abbas@mq.edu.au
yxiang@swin.edu.au (Y. Xiang), Shui.Yu@uts.edu.au (S. Yu).
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they have largely missed the in-vehicle vulnerabilities (e.g., vulnerabilities
of ECUs and software vulnerabilities). A survey by Bernardini et al. [11]
covers security vulnerabilities in internal vehicle communications,
including the ECU, and in gateways, including the On-Board Diagnostics
(OBD), Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS), electrical charging sys-
tem,RemoteKeyless System (RKS), and infotainment system.However, not
too many details are covered for defence mechanisms.
In comparison, based on the detailed walk-through of the architecture
of intelligent vehicle systems, we present an in-depth analysis of security
attacks, challenges, and defence mechanisms in this kind of intelligent
vehicle system.
The critical structures of the paper are illustrated in Fig. 1, which
taxonomizes the security of intelligent vehicles according to the
following attributes: (i) Intelligent vehicle system architecture: we give
an overview of the electronic/electrical architecture of intelligent vehicle
systems as well as the in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communication net-
works, the computation platform, and new sensors in intelligent vehicles.
(ii) Security requirements and identified attacks: we discuss security re-
quirements for vehicular systems in four categories (authentication,
integrity, privacy, and availability) and present a classification of attacks
on vehicles and vehicular networks. (iii) Defences against the attacks: we
refer to a list of existing defence techniques, including cryptography,
signature-based detection, anomaly-based detection, softwareFig. 1. Key structures of our
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vulnerability detection, and malware detection, which can be used to
deal with security challenges in automotive systems. (iv) Future di-
rections: we show the possible areas (e.g., lightweight authentication,
software-defined security, deep learning) for further studies. Explicitly,
this paper aims to answer four research questions:
 What are the state-of-the-art vehicle systems?
 What are the unique research challenges in securing vehicle systems?
 What are the main defences and their pros and cons?
 And what are promising solutions to improve security?
And this paper makes the following contributions:
 We provide a detailed description of system architecture for intelli-
gent vehicles, which covers structure design, communication net-
works, computation platforms, and new sensors used.
 We raise the security requirements and identify possible security at-
tacks to intelligent connected vehicles.
 Based on a detailed analysis of existing defence mechanisms against
intelligent vehicle system attacks, we propose some promising
research directions.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections: Section 2
gives an overall review of the state-of-the-art architectures of intelligenttechnical contribution.
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxvehicle systems. Section 3 discusses the current security attacks and
challenges faced by intelligent vehicle systems In Section 4, we highlight
the best practices for dealing with these security challenges in intelligent
vehicle systems. Section 5 discusses some promising future directions to
address those security challenges in intelligent vehicle systems. Limita-
tions and threats to the validity of this study are discussed in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Intelligent vehicle system architecture
Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) are now an active research
topic in the automotive industry. Many intelligent driving functionalities
have been installed on passenger cars, such as Lane Keeping Assistance
(LKA), Lane Departure Warning (LDW), and other assistance systems.
Surely, a high-level intelligent vehicle should be able to accomplish all
these functionalities. However, it is not feasible to integrate all these
intelligent assistance systems by puttting them together, as the tradi-
tional Electrical/Electronic Architecture (EEA) was not designed to
support so many intelligent functionalities. Notably, the required abili-
ties of data acquisition and processing are beyond the limit of the
traditional EEA. The next-generation EEA, which can support high-level
ICVs, is the key to the ICV’s series production. The next-generation EEA
needs fundamental advancement in three parts: the overall structure
design, the in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communication network, and the
computation platform.
2.1. The overall EEA of intelligent vehicle
The topology design of the overall architecture is fundamental to
improve the performance of EEA. The main task of the topology design is
to ensure the data flow on the network matches the need of each node. As
shown in Fig. 2, the traditional EEA topology is based on the Controller
Area Network (CAN). Due to the characteristics of the CAN, every node in
the networkmust share the bandwidth with each other. The bandwidth is
like a bottleneck that limits the data processing ability of each ECU on the
network. The core problem of the traditional EEA is the lack of space for a
high computation power unit, which is necessary for intelligent driving.
The topology of next-generation EEA should specify where the complex
computation is realized and how the huge amount of data is transferred.
One feasible approach is the domain-based topology, which has been
recently applied in the production of vehicles. Its concept is to divide the
autonomous driving system into several domains. Its main difference
with the traditional EEA is the occurrence of domain ECU, which is the
core computation platform of each domain. The vehicle components can
be classified into different domains according to their functionalities.
Usually, the sensors and actuators that can be shared by differentFig. 2. Gateway-based
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functionalities would be grouped as one domain. For example, the
commonly used domains are the infotainment domain, the chassis
domain, and the safety domain. The domain-based EEA is illustrated by
Fig. 3. The domain-based topology has advantages over the traditional
one. First of all, it can support more complex intelligent driving func-
tions, as each domain ECU has more power in both communication and
computation. The domain ECU can be directly connected to sensors in the
domain without the problem of sharing the bandwidth. It is also a
computation platform to integrate related simple control functions into a
complex behavior control function [12]. Furthermore, the distributed
computation strategy of the domain-based topology has the advantage of
being more compatible with the traditional EEA system. The domains can
be relatively independent from each other, only transmitting necessary
information to other domains. The data flow within the domain will not
occupy the bandwidth and other resources of the backbone.
The centralized architecture is another approach for the EEA of next-
generation vehicles. In a centralized architecture, most of the computa-
tion tasks are executed in the central computation entity, as illustrated in
Fig. 4, rather than distributed in different functional domains. Most of the
components should be connected to the central computation entity,
which could access all sensors and actuators. The benefit of a centralized
topology is the ability to realize complete sensor fusion. In theory, when
the central computation entity could combine more information, it has
the potentials to make a better decision. However, a centralized topology
has higher demands on the data communication capabilities. The
centralized EEA needs to group the components into different sub-
networks according to their physical placement or network properties
to improve communication efficiency. The controller of the sub-network
is called a zone controller in Ref. [13].2.2. The in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communication network of intelligent
vehicles
As mentioned above, one of the most significant challenges for the
next-generation EEA is managing the high-speed communication among
a vehicle’s electronic components with a limited cost. The most suc-
cessful communication network in the current automotive industry is the
CAN protocol. The CAN protocol is developed by Bosch corporation, and
it has been the most widely used standard in the field of vehicle hardware
communication since its publication in 1986 [14]. Compared with other
network technologies, the CAN has outstanding advantages in
cost-efficiency and flexibility. A variant of the CAN is one with the
Flexible Data rate (CAN-FD) [15,16] with a bandwidth of up to 8 Mb/s
[17]. The CAN is a multi-master network in which every node could
equally and independently receive and broadcast information. With this
characteristic, the CAN is almost a plug-and-play system: new ECUs orE/E architecture.
Fig. 3. Domain-based E/E architecture.
Fig. 4. Centralized E/E architecture.
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modification of the network. Nevertheless, it also makes the communi-
cation system vulnerable to attacks.
In many subsystems of vehicles, different kinds of specialized
communication networks are developed for specific automotive appli-
cations. Each of these networks has its own advantages. They will
probably exist in vehicles for a long time. However, they are unlikely to
be employed as the backbone communication network in the EEA of the
next generation. A LIN (Local Interconnect Network) permits a low-cost
and flexible wire harness and can be easily implemented without spe-
cial support requirements. However, the bandwidth capacity of the LIN is
only 20 kb/s. It is usually used in the switches and motors that roll
windows and control seats. The FlexRay protocol was designed to sup-
port the use of full electric/electronic systems for performing the vehi-
cle’s safety-critical functions, including “brake-by-wire”, “suspension-by-
wire”, “steer-by-wire”, and in general “x-by wire” [18]. FlexRay can
ensure real-time communication between safety-critical components
with little time delay with a built-in mechanism of time synchronization.
Media Oriented Serial Transport (MOST) is another in-vehicle network.
MOST was developed to support infotainment devices and related ap-
plications in vehicles [19–21]. It employs plastic optical fibers as its
physical layer, so the network is isolated from EMI (Electro-Magnetic
Interference), preventing problems like buzzing sounds in the infotain-
ment system.4
A promising candidate for the backbone communication network is
the Automotive Ethernet (AE) [22–24]. Though the Ethernet is not a new
idea for data communication, it still needs a considerable amount of
modification and research to be utilized by vehicles. It was until 2013
that the first application of AE appeared in producing vehicles when the
BMW X5 used AE for connecting onboard cameras. A comparison be-
tween the AE and other networks is shown in Table 1. The main ad-
vantages of the AE are as follows: (1) Larger bandwidth. Currently, the
bandwidth capacity of the AE protocol is 100 Mbps; and in the near
future, it will be increased to 1 Gbps. (2) Improved security. The Ethernet
employs an IP-based routing method, thus it prevents one compromised
ECU from performing malicious attacks on the whole communication
system. Moreover, the switches in the Ethernet can manage the infor-
mation flow in the network, and avoid hi-jacked ECUs flooding overload
data into the network.
The emergence of various wireless communication technologies en-
ables the development of cooperative communication, in particular, the
breakthrough of 4G Long Term Evolution(LTE) and 5G remote commu-
nication technologies, and the development of Dedicated Short-Range
Communication(DSRC)-supported Vehicle-to-Everything (V2E) commu-
nications. The next important step is accident-free driving based on inter-
vehicle communications and cooperative ITS [26]. Cooperative
perception-based V2E provides an exciting opportunity for developing
more reliable target recognition and tracking in the Field of View (FoV)
Table 1
Specifications of common vehicle buses [25].
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objects [28–30] or objects outside the FoV by multimodal sensor data
fusion [25,31,32].2.3. The computation platform for intelligent vehicle
Traditionally, simple controllers such as MicroController Units
(MCUs) and Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) were well established in
vehicles for data processing of various functions, including taillights on
and off [33], air-conditioning [34], powertrain [35], etc. Meanwhile,
DSPs can execute more complicated applications, like onboard multi-
media systems [36] and driver assistance functions [37,38], which
require high integration and excellent processing capacity.
In high-level ICVs, more than hundreds of millions of lines of codes
are expected to be executed by the processors to realize intelligent al-
gorithms, including sensor fusion and deep learning. Therefore, a
powerful computation platform with better hardware and software
design is urgently needed. Both Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are believed to have wide
applications in the automotive industry in the near future. A GPU is
specialized in massively parallel computation, and thus it is very good at
image processing [39], which makes it ideal in self-driving vehicles for
complex computational systems, such as obstacle detection systems and
collision avoidance systems. Another option is FPGAs that are suitable for
parallel computing and have less energy consumption.
The software system is another indispensable task of a computation
platform. The software used in the automotive industry has its own re-
quirements. Open Systems and their interfaces for the Electronics in
Motor Vehicles/Vehicle Distributed eXecutive (OSEK/VDX) is a joint
project that is developed by the European automotive industry. The aim
of this project is to develop a real-time operating system for automotive
applications [40]. Another important project is JASPAR (Japan Auto-
motive Software Platform and Architecture) established in 2004 by
Japan, and well-known corporations, including Toyota, Nissan, and
Honda, are among its member companies. It should be mentioned that
one major drawback of OSEK/VDX and JASPAR is that they fail to take
the reusability and transferability demanded by the modern automotive
electronics industry into account. The AUTomotive Open System
ARchitecture(AUTOSAR) standard is developed to separate the applica-
tion software from the associated hardware, and thus save development
costs [41]. However, AUTOSAR still needs further development to sup-
port complicated perception algorithms and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
applications.
Although general operating systems such as Linux and Android sup-
port highly complex algorithms, the major problem is that they cannot be
used as automotive embedded software. It is necessary to develop a
software platform that combines the advantages of both the automotive5
software system and the general operating system [42]. Currently,
AUTOSAR as a global partnership for developing automotive software is
standardizing the AUTOSAR adaptive platform. In particular, providing a
stable programming interface as well as supporting the Ethernet-based
EEA are the two major objectives of this software platform [43]. In
software development, software update and security are two primary
concerns. For an autonomous driving vehicle, it is necessary to update its
software even after it has been sold, just like a smartphone. Over-the-air
updates can bring lots of convenience and benefits to both consumers and
manufacturers. The security during updates is quite important and is
becoming a hot research topic [44].
2.4. New sensors in intelligent vehicles
To achieve full observations of both the vehicle’s own state, the
surroundings and even the situation beyond the visual range, the intel-
ligent vehicle needs to be equipped with many new sensors. By
comparing the sensors used in autonomous driving competitions [45–49]
as shown in Fig. 5, we can see the current trends in perception technol-
ogy. The fusion of multi-sensors is widely accepted as an essential
method to ensure perception robustness. The sensor fusion for the
high-level ICV mainly refers to the following sensors: LiDaR, radar, and
intelligent cameras.
 LiDaR: LiDaR, which stands for Light Detection and Ranging, enables
self-driving cars to observe the world. In fact, it is achieved by uti-
lizing laser light pulses. High-definition LiDaR provides a 360-degree
field of view with more than 16 laser channels. Regarding rotation
mechanisms, LiDaR may be classified into three main categories:
mechanical LiDaR, semisolid-state LiDaR, and solid-state LiDaR.
 Radar: Millimeter-wave radar is capable of penetrating non-
transparent materials, such as smoke, dust, snow, and fog. In other
words, the main advantage of millimeter-wave radar is its capability
to handle small size, all-weather, and long detection distance. How-
ever, low horizontal resolution and low lateral detection accuracy are
the most significant limitations of millimeter-wave radars [50,51].
Due to these shortcomings, millimeter wave radar needs to be fused
with other sensors to improve the accuracy of the target perception
system. One solution is the fusion of millimeter-wave radar and
monocular camera [52–54].
 Intelligent visual sensors: The monocular visual system and the
stereo vision system are the main intelligent visual sensors in intel-
ligent vehicles. They are utilized in order to achieve semantic seg-
mentation of the driving environment [50], target detection and
tracking [55], ranging [56,57], driver distraction and fatigue detec-
tion [58], and so on [59,60]. AI technologies, such as deep learning,
are deeply integrated into the visual sensors to provide more accurate
detection results. However, visual sensors are unstable in changing
light conditions. What is worse, the AI algorithm may be attacked,
leading to a false detection result.
3. Security requirements and identified attacks
In recent years, we have seen an increasing amount of research
related to vehicular networks, and fully automated vehicles are fast
becoming a reality. They have a tremendous potential to increase effi-
ciency and safety for their occupants, and they have already been
implemented in trials in a number of locations around the United States
and throughout Europe [61,62]. Understandably, as with any new
technology, there is a certain amount of hesitation regarding self-driving
vehicles. And this has been further enhanced by recent incidents in
California and Arizona in the United States [63,64], where the
self-driving vehicles have been involved in incidents with pedestrians.
This has prompted a number of companies like Uber to slow down or
suspend the deployment of self-driving vehicles [65], in an attempt to
optimize the operation and restore public confidence. In addition to
Fig. 5. Mainstream sensors used in autonomous driving competitions and projects.
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ceptible to a number of malicious attacks and intrusions, where users are
going to cause damage intentionally to the vehicles or their occupants.
In 2016, a group of Chinese security researchers from Keen Security
Lab discovered a method to hack a Tesla CAN bus, which can be found in
almost all intelligent cars and controls indicators and brakes [66]. They
were able to remotely access the central control unit and adjust the
mirrors, lock the doors, manipulate the dashboard, and even apply the
brakes. This was reported to Tesla who quickly provided an update for its
vehicles. However, this event clearly revealed that there was a real issue
with the outdated software being used. Recently, another team from
Keen Security Lab discovered 14 vulnerabilities in BMW cars [67]. They
discovered that they were able to use a backdoor to gain access to the
telematics control unit as well as the CAN bus. Similar to Tesla, BMW’s
response was to roll out upgrades for the affected models. These were
made available over an air connection or for customers at the BMW
dealerships. Similarly, researchers in the Netherlands discovered a
method to get around the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID)-based
key immobilizers [68], which have been used as a primary security
feature by many automotive manufacturers since 1996. The authors in
Ref. [68] used a method that bypasses the cryptographic authentication,
while it can be conducted in less than 6 min with no specialized hard-
ware. The next section discusses some system-level security requirements
for vehicular networks. The subsequent section details the various types
of attacks to which intelligent vehicles are vulnerable.3.1. Security requirements
Successful, safe and secure implementation of intelligent vehicular
systems is dependent on designing and developing an extensive security
framework. Therefore, vehicular systems must abide by strict security
requirements. Identification of appropriate security requirements in the
early stages of conceptual design and development plays a key role in
ensuring that vehicles and occupants will remain safe and secure at all
times. Throughout the literature, authentication, integrity, privacy, and
availability among the most significant prerequisites need to be provided
by a security system [69]. In this section, we discuss these four categories
as key requirements for successful and secure integration of vehicular6
systems. Studying security requirements will provide deep knowledge of
security attacks, security vulnerabilities, and security defences.
3.1.1. Authentication
Authentication in vehicular systems is an important attribute that
needs to be considered carefully in the early stages of system design and
implementation. It means that authorized users can only access data/
information. In essence, only the intended parties should be able to have
access to the message and retrieve its original contents. In order to meet
the authentication requirements, key management and distribution must
be efficient and accurate.
3.1.2. Integrity
In vehicular networks, it is essential to be able to validate that the
message has not been corrupted during transmission by degradation
factors such as noise and fading, as well as deliberately corrupted by an
attacker.
3.1.3. Privacy
In the Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
modes of communication, where vehicles employ different techniques
for sharing information (e.g., information about their geographical lo-
cations) and creating a cooperation-oriented environment among vehi-
cles and RSUs, the shared information can be used maliciously to track
users [70]. Hence, privacy is another significant challenge in intelligent
vehicle systems, and sensitive information must be protected by intelli-
gent cars [11].
3.1.4. Availability
In vehicular communications, improving the chance of getting in-
formation by all targeted vehicles is of great importance. Vehicular net-
works are highly dynamic, and the network must be able to respond in
real-time.3.2. Security attacks
In addition to the requirements described above, in order for vehic-
ular networks to be securely and successfully deployed, they must defend
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxagainst cyber threats. Threats to security must be mitigated whenever
possible; in other words, a proactive approach to threats should be a key
requirement that must be met. However, since it is impossible to predict
all possible threats to the network, reactive approaches must be effective
and deployed quickly and efficiently. It is important that users experience
as little disruption as possible as a result of an attack. The following
sections present a classification of attacks that affect vehicles. We will
focus on the strategies of these attacks and also general mitigation
techniques to give a comparative analysis in Table 2.
3.2.1. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
DoS attacks involve flooding a host with an enormous amount of
information in an attempt to overload it, effectively preventing it from
receiving or processing information coming in from legitimate users. In
vehicular networks, the primary target for attackers would be the Road-
Side Unit (RSU). RSUs are a core component in vehicular networks as
they authenticate, manage and update vehicles and their information.
The simplest method to combat DoS attacks is to block the attacker’s IP
address. In traditional DoS attacks, a single attacker attacks a node or a
channel using a single IP address, usually from a single vehicle. This often
places a huge burden on the attacker’s resources. As a result, attackers
often use multiple IP addresses in distributed attacks, reducing the
resource burden. Distributed DoS attacks are even harder to mitigate and
combat because the incoming messages can come from a large number of
vehicles. Therefore, it becomes useless to simply block a single IP
address. Similar to the DoS attack, distributed DoS attacks can be per-
formed on both RSUs and other vehicles on the network.
3.2.2. Black-hole attacks
In a black-hole attack on the vehicular network, an attacker drops
packets instead of forwarding them to their destination, creating a hole
where no packets can move through the network to other vehicles. A
variant of the black-hole attack is called the grey-hole attack. In a grey-
hole attack, the attacker only drops a percentage of packets. Attackers
do this in order to avoid detection. One solution to the black-hole attack
is adding sequence numbers to the packets.
3.2.3. Replay attacks
Replay attacks are a variant of the man-in-the-middle attacks in which
a valid transmission data is repeated or delayed. In vehicular networks,
replay attacks often target communications between the vehicle and the
RSU. If an attacker intercepts a message between an RSU and a vehicle
containing the encryption key or password, it would be able to authen-
ticate itself later. Man-in-the-middle and replay attacks are difficult to
mitigate effectively, as it is almost impossible for a vehicle or an RSU to
know when it is under attack. In most cases, attackers are highly mobile
and do not alter the packets in any way. Mitigation methods include the
implementation of a strong encryption method, using virtual private
networks, and using time-delay variation [71].Table 2
Comparison of security attacks in vehicular networks.
Attacks Strategy General mitigation
techniques
DoS Flooding Blocking IP
Black-Hole Dropping Adding sequence number
to packets
Replay Repeating/Delaying Cryptography
Sybil Operating multiple identities
actively at the same time
Cryptography
Impersonation Sending message on behalf of
other nodes
Cryptography




Spreading false information Reputation-based
schemes
Timing Adding time slots to create delay Fixed data rate
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3.2.4. Sybil attacks
Sybil attacks, or pseudospoofing attacks as they are sometimes
known, involve a user creating a large number of pseudonymous iden-
tities [72,73] to have a greater influence on the network. Sybil attacks
can be used in vehicular networks to route traffic in a certain direction,
for example, when an attacker creates a large number of pseudonymous
identities at certain locations. The increase in the number of users at a
certain location indicates that there is severe congestion at that location
which would force other vehicles to change their own routing to avoid
the congested areas. In vehicular networks, when Sybil attacks are per-
formed with the assistance of Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing
attacks (where an attacker attempts to appear at a location where they
are not), it would allow the attackers to ensure that they have a
congestion-free route. A congestion-free route would be created because
all other vehicles would attempt to route around problem areas. The most
effective mitigation methods are identification and authentication based
methods using cryptography.
3.2.5. Impersonation attacks
In vehicular networks, malicious nodes would impersonate RSUs in
an attempt to trick users into divulging their authentication details.
After the authentication information has been acquired, it can be used
to access classified information or even as authentication with other
parties. Attackers could also impersonate other vehicles to gain an
advantage. For example, an attacker might choose to impersonate an
emergency vehicle, which would give them a higher priority within the
network and lead to less congestion. Methods based on encryption,
localization, and clustering can be used to mitigate the effects of
impersonation attacks.
3.2.6. Malware
Since vehicular networks are highly dynamic and will be changed and
updated frequently, vehicles must ensure that updates and information
that they receive come from a trusted source. If they don’t, they become
infected, risking losing personal information and, in some cases, having
critical malfunctions. The easiest way to reduce malware attacks is to
introduce a firewall that filters malicious messages from legitimate ones.
However, additional methods are sometimes needed, as attacks have
been known to findmethods around firewalls [74]. In addition to firewall
protection, reputation-based schemes are often introduced to ensure that
only messages from trusted parties are accepted.
3.2.7. Falsified-information attack
Attackers can spread falsified information about the congestion on
roads to effectively force other drivers to diverge to alternate routes.
They can also create congestion by neglecting to report congestion or
accidents on the road. This form of attack is often combated by using
reputation-based schemes that reward drivers that send out legitimate
information and punish drivers that send out falsified information.
3.2.8. Timing attacks
Time synchronization is a key aspect of intelligent connected ve-
hicles. Vehicles move in and out of networks very rapidly, which in-
troduces the need for real-time updates and information exchange
between both RSUs and vehicles. Since time-critical message exchange
in safety and warning applications is critical, any delay in messages
can cause serious problems. Timing attacks are similar in many ways
to black and grey hole attacks. However, instead of dropping all or part
of the packets, a malicious node adds a time slot to introduce an
intentional delay. This causes major problems, especially in autono-
mous vehicles where a delay in time-sensitive information can lead a
major accident. One proposed solution for timing attacks in vehicular
networks is to force all vehicles to send and receive packages at fixed
data rates [75].
Table 2 lists security attacks and demonstrates their strategies and
general mitigation techniques.
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This part of the paper aligns the above-mentioned attacks with
different components of the intelligent vehicle system architecture
identified in Section 2. Table 3 lists security attacks on different com-
ponents in intelligent vehicles, including the overall EEA, communica-
tion network, computation platform, and new sensors. An intelligent
vehicle with its components is shown in Fig. 6. Below, we demonstrate
the identified attacks on these components.
 Overall EEA: As mentioned earlier, the in-vehicle networks (CAN,
LIN, FlexRay, and MOST) are vulnerable to different cybersecurity
attacks. Through an On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) port or a USB port,
attackers can stop the engine or brakes of a vehicle and cause a fatal
car crash [76]. Replay attacks and impersonation attacks on CAN
buses are reported in Ref. [77]. Nilsson et al. [78] simulated a
spoofing (Sybil) attack on the FlexRay bus by creating and injecting
diagnostic messages. Another instance is the EEA of the Electrical
Vehicle (EV). In recent years, the use of EVs that can be recharged
from an external source of electricity has dramatically increased. The
architecture of EV charging-station systems makes it possible for in-
formation exchange between EVs and Electric Vehicle Supply
Equipment (EVSV) that may be used for payment systems for public
charging stations. Consequently, EVs are subject to cybersecurity at-
tacks by the charging-plug interface. The International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) has defined the communication protocol
between a charging station and an EV by the IEC 61851 and Inter-
national Standardization Organization (ISO) 15118 standards [79].
 Communication network: DSRC, LTE, Wi-Fi, and Worldwide Inter-
operability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) are among the available
communication standards and technologies for V2V and V2I data
communications. V2E or inter-vehicle communications are wireless,
and security is considered one of the most significant challenges of
V2E technology [80]. Moreover, audio and video players, automotive
navigation systems, USB and Bluetooth connectivity, Carputers, audio
control, hands-free voice control, and general infotainment systems
have increased security concerns about potential remote car hacking.
In reviewing the literature, Sybil attack [81], black-hole attack [82],
Dos attack, DDoS attack, replay attack, and timing attack [83] on the
communication network of intelligent vehicle systems are found. In
addition, V2V communications are susceptible to malware attacks
[84].
 Computational platform:Malware can infiltrate software systems of
intelligent vehicles. Additionally, DoS attacks can be launched to
destroy the processing ability of a vehicle [85].
 New sensors: The TPMS is a warning system for measuring the air
pressure of tires by pressure sensors or monitoring individual wheel
rotational speeds and warning the driver when tires are under-
inflated. A TPMS notifies the driver when a vehicle’s tire pressure is
low. Under those circumstances, a security issue related to the TPMS
is that a vehicle may be tracked using existing sensors along the
roadways [85]. Another instance is RKS or smart key that is most
widely used as an electronic authorization system in order to control
access to the vehicle. Sensors in the vehicle are able to sense the
received signal from the remote key. Along with this growth in using
smart keys, however, there is an increasing concern over their secu-
rity vulnerabilities. The most compelling evidence is a surveillanceTable 3
Security attacks on components of intelligent vehicles.
DoS DDoS Black-Hole Replay S
Overall E/E architecture ✓ ✓




video released by West Midland police department in Birmingham,
England, in 2017 that shows two hackers exploiting keyless tech-
nology to steal a Mercedes-Benz [86]. In Ref. [87], a
falsified-information attack on the LiDaR system, which observes the
surrounding environment of an intelligent vehicle, is reported.
All the requirements and attacks mentioned above lead to the
conclusion that securing intelligent vehicles is of great importance. Thus,
security solutions, mechanisms, and techniques should be used to deal
with these attacks. In the next section, we will present some key findings
and our analysis.
4. Existing defences against the attacks
In this section, we walk through a variety of existing defences (Fig. 7),
which can be used as best practices to deal with the security attacks
identified in Section 3 and analyze the pros and cons of these defences.
Table 4 lists all security defences presented in this section and associates
them with security requirements and security attacks.4.1. Cryptography
This section provides an overview of cryptography-based algorithms
used to enhance security for vehicular networks. In intelligent vehicular
systems, encryption is an essential key to ensure safety. The section that
follows outlines a number of existing security algorithms based on
symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and attribute-
based encryption.
4.1.1. Symmetric encryption
In symmetric-key cryptology, a single key is used both to encrypt and
decrypt data, as shown in Fig. 8. Traditionally, symmetric keys were
seldom used in point-to-point communication. They were primarily used
in retrieval situations, where the data was stored in a database at a
central location. However, they gained popularity because they were
simple and much faster than asymmetric keys.
In [88], a decentralized method is proposed to authenticate vehicles
using hash functions. The Two-Factor LIghtweight Privacy-preserving
(2FLIP) algorithm works in two steps to provide fast and accurate
authentication. In the first step, a thematic device is used to identify the
driver using fingerprints or face recognition. The key strength of using a
biological password is nonrepudiation. In other words, driving evidence
or sent messages are undeniable. This is denoted as a biological password
and is needed along with the Certificate Authority (CA) for user
authentication. The second step is the decentralization of the CA, which
means that constant transmission of the CA is not needed for increasing
overall efficiency. The authors claim that the new method has a large
improvement in terms of computational complexity as opposed to
existing schemes. The results of performance evaluation indicate that in
the 2FLIP, the computation cost has been reduced 100–1000 times, and
the communication overhead has been decreased between 55% and 77%.
The reduction in overhead makes this method highly practical. A
disadvantage of this algorithm is that all new drivers would have to be
subjected to an authentication phase to add them to the list of authen-
ticated drivers.
Pseudorandom authentication can also be used to authenticate a





Fig. 6. Typical components of intelligent vehicles.
Fig. 7. Existing defences against the attacks.
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxRef. [89], a pseudorandom method is used to authenticate users at the
RSU. Each user is sent a pseudorandom key that no other vehicle on the
network knows. This keeps the identity of each user hidden and known
only by the RSU. Pseudonymous Authentication with Conditional Privacy
(PACP) is used to generate pseudorandom keys. When the users register
at the motor vehicle department, they are handed a ticket with a unique
ID that authenticates them and generates a pseudorandom key. Although
this scheme is effective, it has very high overhead and is prone to identity
theft, as malicious nodes could possibly intercept or copy the ticket ac-
quired at the motor vehicle department. A similar scheme is presented
where the RSU sends out a large number of pseudorandom keys and
matching certificates. These messages are sent to all users on the
network. Then when a user wants to transmit, they would do so by using
the pseudorandom key. When the message reaches the receiver, it can be
authenticated using the corresponding certificate. Similar to the previous
method, this algorithm needs a large amount of overhead. In Ref. [90], an
Elliptic-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-based scheme is9
proposed. A typical ECDSA scheme works in three stages: the key gen-
eration, signature generation, and signature verification stages. In order
for a vehicle to be authenticated, they must be able to generate a valid
signature using a public key, whereas the signature generation phase has
a low computational complexity associated with it. The highest compu-
tational complexity lies in the signature-verification phase, where the
receiver must verify that the signature is legitimate from a large list of
possible signatures. The method proposed in Ref. [90] introduces a
scheme that implements an ECDSA verification engine that is able to
verify up to 27,000 signatures per second. This presents a significant
reduction in latency within the network. A latency of 37 μs for a single
signature verification and an efficiency of 24.5 sGE are achieved, which
is a significant improvement compared with previous methods. A Secure
and Authenticated Key-Management Protocol (SAKMP) is presented in
Ref. [91]. The SAKMP is a distributed key-management protocol that
assigns public keys to users based on their geographic locations. The keys
are generated using a function that ensures that each key is unique and
Table 4
Comparison of security defences based on security attacks and security requirements.
Category Security solutions main mitigated attacks Authentication Integrity Privacy Availability
Cryptography 2FLIP [88] DoS ✓ ✓ ✓ Medium
PACP [89] Eavesdropping, replay, impersonation ✓ ✓ Medium
ECDSA [90] All malicious attacks ✓ Medium
SA-KMP [91] DoS, replay, impersonation ✓ ✓ ✓ Medium
Calandriello et al. [92] DoS, jamming ✓ ✓ ✓ Limited
PPGCV [93] Collusion ✓ ✓ Limited
TACKs [94] Eavesdropping, Sybil, correlation ✓ ✓ Limited
GSIS [95] DoS ✓ ✓ ✓ Limited
DABE [96] Collusion ✓ Limited
ABACS [97] Collusion ✓ Limited
Xia et al. [98] Collusion, replay ✓ ✓ Limited
Bouabdellah et al. [99] Black-hole ✓ Limited
Network Security Biβmeyer et al. [100] Sybil ✓ ✓ ✓ Medium
REST-Net [101] Impersonation, falsified information ✓ ✓ N/A
CIDS [102] DoS, masquarade ✓ Limited
Martynov et al. [103] DoS Good
IDFVN [104] Selective forwarding, black-hole Medium
Song et al. [105] Message injection N/A
Zaidi et al. [81] Sybil, falsified information ✓ Good
OTIDS [106] DoS, impersonation, fuzzy N/A
PES [107] Sybil ✓ ✓ Medium
AECFV [82] Black-hole, worme hole, Sybil ✓ ✓ Limited
Markovitz et al. [77] Falsified information Meduim
PML-CIDS [108] DoS, probing, unauthorized access ✓ Medium
Software Vulnerability Detection Tice et al. [109] Control-flow ✓ ✓ Good
Dahse and Holz [110] XSS, remote code execution ✓ ✓ Good
PITTYPAT [111] Control-flow ✓ ✓ ✓ Good
DFI [112] Buffer overflow ✓ ✓ ✓ Good
FindBugs [113] Buffer overflow ✓ Medium
Generational Search [114] Malware (Bug) ✓ ✓ N/A
TaintCheck [115] Overwrite ✓ ✓ ✓ Medium
Dytan [116] Control-flow, data-flow, overwrte ✓ ✓ Good
GenProg [117] DoS, overflow ✓ ✓ Medium
Shin et al. [118] Malware (Bug) ✓ ✓ Good
Perl et al. [119] Malware (Bug) ✓ ✓ Good
Zhou and Sharma [120] DoS ✓ ✓ Good
Shar et al. [121] Injection, file inclusion ✓ ✓ Good
VDiscover [122] Malware ✓ ✓ Good
Malware Detection MSPMD [123] Malware ✓ ✓ Limited
MRMR-SVMS [124] Malware ✓ ✓ ✓ Limited
Huda et al. [125] Malware ✓ ✓ N/A
CloudIntell [126] Malware ✓ ✓ Variable
Fig. 8. Symmetric encryption.
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M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxdependents on the user’s ID and location. The location of the user is
obtained using GPS. In order for the algorithm to generate unique keys, a
3D positionmust be established. The key is generated using the x, y, and z
coordinates. The algorithm is only concerned with secure communica-
tion between the RSU and the On-Board Units (OBUs). It would be
challenging to implement this algorithm in V2V communication because
of its dependence on location and the fairly complicated key generation
function. Much like the other symmetric-encryption based methods,
storing a large number of keys produces a very large overhead, especially
for V2V communication.
4.1.2. Asymmetric encryption
Asymmetric cryptography is based on a two-key system (Fig. 9). One
of its disadvantages over symmetric cryptography is that it is much
slower because of the harder mathematical problems associated with
encryption and decryption using separate keys. The keys must also be
longer in order for asymmetric cryptography to be useful.
In [92], a pseudonym-based authentication method is used to secure
communication in VANETs. A hybrid scheme that uses group signatures
to generate on-the-fly pseudonym keys that allow vehicles to remain
anonymous within the network is proposed. In this scheme, a vehicle
registers within a group, at which point it is given the group public key
that can be used to authenticate its messages. This method has low
computational complexity and allows the vehicles to quickly authenti-
cate their messages using a group dynamic key. Through the use of group
public keys, the authors have reduced the amount of storage needed to
execute this method. However, the use of group keys could lead to serious
breaches in the security framework. If an attacker was able to gain access
to the group keys, it would be able to authenticate the messages.
A Privacy-Preserving Group Communication Scheme for VANETs
(PPGCV) is proposed in Ref. [93]. The algorithm works in two phases. In
the first phase, each vehicle in the network is given a pool of keys which
are randomly distributed. These keys are used for Key Encrypting Keys
(KEKs). In order to ensure that the vehicles in the group can communi-
cate, a group key is also established, which can be used to change the key
pool to prevent key leakage. If a single vehicle on the network is
compromised, the central authority assumes that all keys are compro-
mised. This scheme has a comprehensive method for key relocation and,
as such, has the advantage of being robust and hard to predict. But it does
add overhead to the network. In addition, during key reallocation, ve-
hicles are left with no encryption methods and cannot transmit data,
further decreasing the network efficiency. This method also assumes thatFig. 9. Asymmetr
11vehicles can keep track of which keys have been compromised, which
puts an additional burden. If it is not managed properly, then revoked
keys can be used by attackers.
A VANET key-management scheme based on Temporary Anonymous
Certified Keys (TACKs) is introduced in Refs. [94]. In this method, users
are grouped according to their locations. Users that are in close proximity
are given a single group public key. Regional Authorities (RAs) are
appointed within each group to distribute certificates. A TACK is a
short-term certificate that is acquired from the RA. The TACK is used for
signing messages. It is a method of authenticating each vehicle within the
group. When a vehicle enters a new geographical area or after some set
period of time, the TACK expires, and a new one is issued. This ensures
that attackers are not able to associate any particular key with any
particular user. The new key is generated randomly by any vehicle after
its previous key has expired. The new key, along with the group user key,
are sent out for authentication by the RA. The RA authenticates the key
and updates its internal records accordingly. This scheme’s main
advantage is the minimal overhead associated with it, especially at the
OBU. Most of the computational complexity and authentication are done
at the RA. A disadvantage is that the scheme is very
infrastructure-dependent and cannot be used in a distributed environ-
ment. Temporary Authentication and Revocation Indicator (TARI), an
algorithm based on TACK, was proposed in Ref. [127]. It is based on the
same security principles as TACK. TARI also uses group signatures that
are dependent on the geographical locations of the OBUs. TARI has a
different method of authentication. It uses an AI to authenticate OBUs
after they have received a message. Each user is verified within its own
group. The primary advantage of TARI over TACK is that it uses
symmetric-key cryptography, which significantly reduces its overhead.
However, it suffers from the same drawbacks of TACK, which makes it
highly dependent on a centralized topology.
A method called Group Signature and Identity-based Signature (GSIS)
is used to tackle security and conditional privacy in vehicular networks
[95]. GSIS proposes to use another two-step process to ensure a high level
of security. It groups vehicles into clusters based on their locations. Then,
using a group structure, all vehicles are able to securely communicate
with each other in a safe and secure manner. Users outside the cluster are
ignored. A significant reduction in computational complexity is achieved,
as only a single key has to be stored. This could present a problem: if an
attacker is to acquire the public key, it would be treated as a part of the
group. The communication between the RSU and the cars is achieved
using ID-based cryptography. Each message is sent out with a digitalic encryption.
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxsignature called an Identity (ID). The ID numbers for the RSUs are used as
public keys, whereas the licence plates of the vehicles are used as their
private keys. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a light-
weight accurate algorithm, which can guarantee the high level authen-
tication of vehicular communication. The drawback of this method is its
susceptibility to man-in-the-middle-attacks, especially within the cluster
configuration where vehicle-to-vehicle communication is conducted.
4.1.3. Attribute-based encryption
Compared with symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE) is gaining popularity, especially in intelligent
connected vehicles due to the adaptability of ABE to the dynamic net-
works [128]. The ABE is a form of encryption that uses specific attributes
(or a set of attributes) to encrypt data. As such, in order to decrypt the
data, one must have a satisfactory configuration/combination of attri-
butes [129]. The ABE was first introduced in 2005 by Sahai and Walters
in Refs. [130]. They presented ABE as an application of fuzzy identi-
ty-based encryption. This was later expanded in Refs. [131], where the
authors present a general framework for the attribute-based cryptology,
seen as a more flexible alternative to the rigid traditional public-private
key cryptography. Instead of using fixed public and private keys, the
encryption is done using specific attributes. The attributes are taken from
a pool, which includes an entire library. Only users or groups of users
with the same properties as the ones chosen are able to decrypt the
message.
This form of encryption is quickly becoming very popular because of
its flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency. In Ref. [96], a secure, selec-
tive group broadcast in vehicular networks using dynamic
attribute-based encryption is presented. In traditional attribute-based
methods, key generation is based on a combination of certain attri-
butes. The attributes selected depend on the policy of the sender. This
again depends on what user/group of users the sender intends the mes-
sage for. When an attribute expires or needs to be replaced, the entire set
of attributes must be replaced. This causes considerable overhead and
delay. This is especially a problem in vehicular-based networks, where
the number of users within a network is highly dynamic. The authors in
Ref. [96] propose an algorithm that uses the attribute-based cryptology
where each attribute is treated independently, as opposed to a set. When
a single attribute elapses or needs to be replaced for some other reasons,
it is replaced independently and has no need to change other attributes.
The main advantage of this method is the significant reduction in the
overhead of the network. However, synchronization between users about
which attribute is relevant and which has been changed presents a
problem in practical implementation. A similar scheme is presented in
Refs. [132], where the authors present an algorithm that looks to
dynamically add and remove attributes without affecting the rest of the
access control policy tree. In Refs. [132] a fading function is introduced
to each attribute, making attributes dynamic and independent. Although
this algorithm presents the problem and solution in a slightly different
framework, it has very similar advantages and disadvantages.
In [97], an Attribute-Based Access-Control System (ABACS) is pro-
posed to enable improved efficiency of emergency vehicles over VANETs.
When an emergency occurs, it is important for the emergency vehicle to
be able to get to the emergency site as quickly and efficiently as possible.
The emergency vehicles must be able to communicate efficiently with
RSUs. The RSUs must be able to identify which emergency vehicles are
close by and which can respond to the emergency the fastest. The RSUs
broadcast a message encrypted using attribute encryption that uses at-
tributes, such as location, type of emergency vehicle (depending on the
emergency, this would be a police car, an ambulance or a fire truck), and
event type. The emergency vehicles that have these attributes are the
only ones that are able to decrypt the message. When an emergency
vehicle encrypts the message, it gets the relevant information and is able
to respond. The algorithm presented by the authors offers high security
and reduces the overhead since only a single broadcast message has to be
sent. In Ref. [98], an adaptive multimedia data-forwarding method is12proposed for privacy preservation in VANETs. The paper puts forward a
scheme that reduces the overhead placed on on-board units in vehicles. It
does this by allowing RSUs to perform a large portion of the overall
encryption. Unlike conventional schemes, the paper presents a frame-
work for not only short messages, but also multimedia applications such
as social media. It does this by ensuring that the overhead is spread be-
tween the OBU and the RSU. Therefore, it is important for vehicles to
effectively pick which RSU they are going to involve in the dissemination
process. Since decryption takes time, it is important that the vehicle re-
mains within the transmission range of the RSU; otherwise, they will
receive partial or incomplete information. The attribute-based encryp-
tion is used by both the RSU and the OBU to ensure that users with the
appropriate attributes are the only ones that receive the message. This
method reduces the computational overhead on the RSUs, which enables
them to be smaller and cheaper to implement. It relies heavily on the
structure of the network. In large networks, there is a possibility that the
RSU would be overwhelmed with large quantities of traffic, causing a
bottleneck in the network. A distributed multi-hop algorithm is proposed
in Ref. [99], where the authors present a protocol that can be utilized
when there is no direct link between the vehicle and the RSU. This paper
concentrates on the situations where the OBUs are out of the range of
RSUs. The primary issue with relaying information across the network is
that malicious users between the source and destination could have a
large impact [133]. In order to tackle this, a scheme using attribute-based
encryption is employed to ensure only users that have the right attributes
receive the message and are able to read them, and a reputation-based
function is used to ensure that the messages are passed over the safest
possible path. The framework for the reputation/trust function is poorly
defined. Additional storage and overhead are added in order to calculate
the reputation and then store the reputation of each secondary user on
the network. However, this scheme is not independent of a centralized
topology. The OBUs are able to communicate in a distributed manner,
which would be quite effective in more remote areas or when the RSU is
under attack. A fine-grained privacy-preserving protocol is introduced in
Ref. [134], which is used to allow service providers to offer certain ser-
vices to certain vehicles within the network. The algorithm uses the
attribute-based encryption to ensure that only authorized vehicles are
able to access the offered services by the service providers. Different
attributes allow users to access different services. To further add security,
a secret sharing scheme is proposed to enforce the fine-grained access
control requirements. The algorithm also allows vehicles to remain
anonymous by using pseudonyms as unique ID-based signatures. This
algorithm is well defined, and it is very effective in ensuring that the
service providers only allow certain users to access their services. It also
allows for vehicles to remain anonymous. However, there are some
concerns that the algorithm would produce a high overhead in practical
situations, especially in large networks.
4.1.4. Summarizing cryptographic defences
It is necessary here to compare the cryptography-based algorithms
used to enhance the security of intelligent vehicles. Table 5 gives a
comparative view of the above-mentioned cryptographic defences and
focuses on their key ideas, advantages, and disadvantages. Cryptography
in vehicular networks is key to providing safety and security for users and
service providers. However, many of the existing cryptographical stan-
dards and practices are inadequate for the new generation of vehicles.
The current cytological standards are often over complicated and place a
high computational burden on the users. They are seldom suitable for
high-speed real-time applications in vehicular networks. The latency or a
delay in communications between the vehicle and the RSU could cause
serious accidents for users. It is, therefore, crucial that cytological stan-
dards are lightweight but secure. It must be noted that security is para-
mount in vehicular networks, and even though real-time applications
require low latency, security must also be considered as a priority.
Therefore, the application of cryptology algorithms in next-generation
vehicles must consider the tradeoff between the security of the
Table 5
Cryptographic defences.
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
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M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxnetwork and the user against application-based parameters that enable
low latency and delay.
To solve these problems,we propose a number of solutions throughout
this paper. These include but are not limited to new 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) standards, software-defined networks, light
authentication, andBlockChaining (BC). In the previous sections,wehave
discussed a number of lightweight authentications methods. In the sec-
tions that follow, we discuss 3GPP standards and software-defined net-
works.Anotherpromising solution to theproblems facedbyVANETs isBC.
As an illustration, the blockchain is a distributed data structure that can
manage financial transactions without the need for a centralized author-
ity. In other words, a genuine copy of a digital ledger is shared among the
parties. Besides, in order to validate new transactions, the public-key
cryptography is utilized for providing multi-signature protection [135].
In Ref. [135], an IoT-based BC method is discussed. The IoT requires
similar attributes from security protocols as VANETs. They both require
low latency and computational complexity, as well as a high level of se-
curity. It is concluded that the blockchain enhances the security of
authentication and authorization and also provides a strong defence13against IoT security attacks such as IP spoofing. This is primarily due to
their high levels of security and scalability [135]. In Ref. [136], the au-
thors present a framework for a lightweight algorithm that is secure and
has low overhead. It is claimed that the fundamental security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability are considered and delivered
using the approach presented in the paper. Significant reductions in
overhead are achieved and confirmed through the simulation of a variety
of scenarios. In Ref. [137], a similar algorithm is presented that is light-
weight and preserves all security features of traditional blockchain algo-
rithms. They proposed an architecture that uses distributed trust to reduce
the block validation processing time. The experimentation and trials are
conducted in a smart home setting that has similar goals and constraints of
VANETs. The simulation of the proposed framework indicates that it has
low packet overhead and low processing overhead.
4.2. Network security
Intelligent vehicles require cooperation from other devices and sen-
sors to perform communications. These communications are imple-
mented between the CAN and the ECUs, and security mechanisms have
not been considered in these settings at all. The CAN and ECUs are
valuable targets for adversaries. For example, a vehicle is connected to
various devices such as smartphones, flash memory, and CD using
different ports (e.g., USB, auxiliary) and various wireless communication
technologies (e.g., 3G, 4G, 5G, WiFi). All of these make the car an open
system. Therefore, it is very necessary to invent suitable countermeasures
to relieve the security risks in the intelligent car. Since Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDSs) are the most effective countermeasure and the most
reliable approach [81,138,139] to protect vehicular networks or tradi-
tional computer networks, this section reviews related works using IDSs
in intelligent cars.
As shown in Fig. 10, there are two main classes of IDSs, including the
signature-based detection and the anomaly-based detection. Recently
published works [140–142] have discussed ways to secure vehicles from
remote attacks by assuming the defense strategy as a network intrusion
detection problem. Recently, 3GPP is working on verifying that 5G sys-
tems are able to utilize 256-bit symmetric cryptography mechanisms
inherited from legacy 4G systems. The handover from one system ar-
chitecture to the next must remain seamless. As a matter of fact, legacy
security visibility and configurability functionality are developing with
the evolution of technology. And in the future, devices will be more
reactive and flexible to various security configurations.
4.2.1. Signature-based detection
This method first stores various existing signatures of known attacks
in a database for retrieving them and making a comparison. Then, it
detects the intrusion attack by comparing oncoming cases from the
Internet of Vehicle (IoV) with existing signatures of known attacks in the
store.
Biβmeyer et al. [100] developed a signature-based IDS that utilizes a
plausibility model for vehicle movement data. The proposed scheme is
able to detect a single fake vehicle even if it uses a valid movement. Two
kinds of attackers can be detected using the proposed algorithm: 1) a fake
congestion attack; 2) a denial of congestion attack.
Tomandl et al. [101] introduced a novel IDS called REST-Net for
VANETs to check fake messages. Different from previous solutions,
REST-Net uses a dynamic engine to analyze and monitor the data, and it
achieves very high detection rates and adaptive warning levels in case
drivers are interrupted. It is also implemented with a concept that is used
for recalling the fake message as long as an attacker is identified.
One of its disadvantages is that it usually causes high false-negative
rates when facing unknown or new attacks. Another disadvantage is
that the signature-based detection fails to detect intrusions with the
development of onboard applications. For example, signature-based
detection may be invalid sometimes as more and more additional de-
vices, such as sensors, are integrated into vehicles.
Fig. 10. (a) Signatute-based detection; (b) Anomaly-based detection.
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Anomaly-based detection predefines the baseline of normal cases,
then new types of attack can be identified once they are observed to have
abnormal information beyond the baseline [143].
Cho and Shin [102] developed a Clock-based IDS (CIDS) for intrusion
detection. CIDS constructs a baseline of the ECUs’ clock behaviors based
on the thus-derived fingerprints, which are extracted from the intervals
of periodic in-vehicle messages. Then, CIDS employs cumulative sum to
detect any abnormal shifts (i.e., signs of intrusion) in identification er-
rors. Experiments showed that CIDS could achieve a low false-positive
rate of 0.055%.
Martynov et al. [103] developed a software-based light-weight IDS
based on properties selected from the signal database. Then, the authors
studied the message cycle time and the plausibility of the messages and
introduced two anomaly-based methods for the IDS. Experiments were
conducted in terms of both simulation and real-world scenarios. Exper-
imental results demonstrate that the proposed IDS can recognize some
malicious events, such as injection of malformed CAN frames, unautho-
rized CAN frames as well as DoS attacks.
Sedjelmaci and Senouci [104] proposed a novel Intrusion Detection
Framework for a Vehicular Network (IDFVN) utilizing detection and
eviction techniques. IDFVN is implemented in two detection agents: a
local intrusion-detection module and a global intrusion-detection mod-
ule. Experiments demonstrate that the IDFVN exhibits a very high
detection rate of more than 98% and a low false-positive rate of lower
than 1.3%.
Songetal. [105]proposeda light-weight intrusion-detectionstrategyby
analyzing time intervals of CANmessages. The authors first experimentally
showed the differences between time intervals of messages in the normal
status andtheunder-attack status.Then, experimentswereconductedbased
on the CAN messages from the cars made by a famous manufacturer. The
results showed the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Zaidi et al. [81] presented a statistical-technique-based IDS for
anomalies and rogue-nodes detection using a traffic model. The proposed
IDS can work independently without relying on any infrastructure. In
order to use the proposed mechanism, network message congestion was
controlled to avoid broadcast storms. Experiments showed that the pro-
posed IDS could keep the network working even if up to 40% of nodes
were malicious.14Lee et al. [106] studied the offset ratio and time interval of message
response performance and proposed an intrusion-detection method. The
proposed method assumes that the receiver node will respond to the
remote frame immediately once a particular identifier is transmitted. It
also assumes that the response performance should be different between
an attack-free state and an attack state. In order to enhance the overall
performance and accuracy of the proposed strategy, a novel algorithm
was also proposed to monitor the change of in-vehicle nodes. Offset radio
and Time interval-based Intrusion Detection System (OTIDS) can achieve
very good performance without modifying the CAN protocol. Moreover,
it can not only identify message injection attacks and impersonating node
attacks but also can detect the types of messages in the injection attacks.
Yu et al. proposed a Presence Evidence System (PES) [107]. The PES
is a statistical method for detecting Sybil attacks in VANETs. The authors
have considered signal-strength distribution analysis of vehicles to esti-
mate their physical positions because position verification is regarded as
one of the best methods for the detection of Sybil attacks. When a claimer
node broadcasts a beacon message at a beacon interval for neighboring
discovery, an estimated position will be calculated for the claimer. The
main idea is to improve estimating the position of a vehicle by using a
RANdom-SAmple Consensus (RANSAC)-based method. It should be
mentioned that the RANSAC algorithm is a well-known learning method
in the field of computer vision for outliers detection. The main limitation
of the PES, however, is that it cannot detect all Sybil attacks.
An accurate and Efficient Collaborative intrusion detection Frame-
work to secure Vehicular networks (AECFV) is introduced by Sedjelmaci
and Senouci [82]. AECFV includes intrusion-detection systems at three
levels: (1) cluster members level; (2) Cluster Heads (CH) level; (3) RSU
level. It should be noted that, along with a rule-based decision technique
and a trust-based scheme [144], AECFV makes use of a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) as a machine-learning method to detect anomalies at the
cluster level. Furthermore, feature extraction, the training process, and
the classification process are the three main components of the SVM in
the proposed model. Moreover, the detection mechanism of AECFV
against different and various types of attacks on VANETs has been dis-
cussed. AECFV is expected to suit scenarios such as a lightweight
communication overhead as well as fast attack detection. However,
inasmuch as AECFV needs to implement IDS on lots of vehicles as cluster
members, it causes a high overhead in large-scale vehicular networks. In
Table 6
Network security defences.




























CIDS [102] Estimates clock skew



























































time intervals of CAN
messages to detect














































Software size in intelligent vehicles.
Manufacturer Model Software Size (lines of code)
Boeing 787 14 million
Lockheed F-22 8 million
Mercedes-Benz S series 20 million
Ford GT 10 million
Ford CES 2016 150 million
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxthe same way, other studies by Sharma and Kaul [145], Wahab et al.
[146], and Sedmalci et al. [147] used SVMs for intrusion detection of
vehicular networks.
Recent developments in the field of machine learning have also led to
a renewed interest in designing intelligent IDSs for in-vehicle anomalies.
One study by Markovitz et al. [77] involved designing a domain-aware
anomaly detection system for the CAN traffic bus in which Ternary
Content-Addressable Memories (TCAMs) have been used for detecting
anomalies in CAN bus network traffic. It must be mentioned that TCAMs
are special types of high-speed memories that modern switches and
routers use them for fast route lookup and packet classification. At first,
in the learning phase, the TCAM learns how to classify CAN packets into
three categories: constant, multi-value, and counter/sensor. Then, in the
testing phase, the TCAM classifier detects irregular messages that do not
match the trained model. The authors evaluated the proposed scheme by
simulated CAN bus traffic and also by real traffic data. It should be
mentioned that the TCAM is implementable in both software and
hardware.
Zhang et al. [108] proposed a Privacy-preserving Machine Learning
based Collaborative Intrusion Detection System (PML-CIDS) against
malicious nodes. The authors argued that privacy is a serious concern for
the proposed approach, PML-CIDS, because vehicles may exchange sen-
sitive information. PML-CIDS consists of different parts: The pre-
processing engine is responsible for collecting and preprocessing data.
The local detection engine is a logistic-regression classifier that is
responsible for intrusion detection by analyzing the preprocessed data
and determining malicious activities. The Privacy-preserving Collabora-
tive Machine Learning (PCML) engine is responsible for updating the
classifier. The main philosophy of PML-CIDS is decentralizing a central-
ized machine-learning approach. For solving this problem, a distributive
optimization method called Alternating Direct Method for Multipliers
(ADMM) has been used to decentralize regularized
Empirical-Risk-Minimization (ERM) algorithms to achieve distributed
training of large datasets. Moreover, PML-CIDS employs a
privacy-preserving scheme of regularized ERM-based optimization called
Dual-Variable Perturbation (DVP), which perturbs each vehicle’s dual
variable at every ADMM iteration. It should be noted that PML-CIDS is a
distributive approach and decreases the overhead [148].
Anomaly detection can also be analyzed from the perspective of big
data analysis with information theory. In this view, anomalies are
considered as rare events with a small probability hidden in the total
information of voluminous amounts of data. These rare events contain
valuable information. In information theory, information measures such
as entropy provide a probable solution for characterizing the distribution
and highlighting the importance of rare events. Furthermore, dimension
reduction of big data and analyzing the relationships among rare events
are necessary to increase efficiency [149].
The disadvantages of anomaly-based detection are: 1) it may cause
high false-positive rates; 2) it is usually hard to prepare proper metrics to
determine the baseline. However, it is expected that data analysis tech-
niques will improve performance in the future.
4.2.3. Summarizing network security defences
In this part of the paper, the most popular network security defences
of vehicular networks are compared. Table 6 lists network security de-
fences and compares their merits and demerits.
4.3. Software vulnerability detection
A well-known fact is that the software is a critical part of the intelli-
gent vehicles, and the vulnerabilities in this software open up new pos-
sibilities to attackers. Therefore, it is important to keep the intelligent
vehicles’ system secure enough in order to prevent any potential threat,
data theft, and even some accidents [150,151]. Many works have been
proposed to identify potential vulnerabilities [152–154]. Static analysis
[155,156], dynamic analysis [157,158], and concolic execution (i.e.,15dynamic symbolic execution) [159] are popularly used techniques for
vulnerability discovery. In this section, we mainly review the works
about vulnerability detection for intelligent vehicles because this is
closely related to this work. For more work about software vulnerability
detection, please refer to Refs. [154,160].
Intelligent vehicles, including aircraft, airplanes, and cars, have mil-
lions of lines of code (Table 7), and the software is responsible for many
safety-critical functions of the vehicle. Drive-by-wire, brake-by-wire,
suspension-by-wire, and in general X-by-wire (Fig. 11) in the automotive
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxindustry refer to the use of fully electric/electronic systems for per-
forming vehicle functions, such as braking or steering, instead of me-
chanical or hydraulic systems [161]. Testing the flight control software is
one of the safety-critical applications which receives the current altitude
of the aircraft and uses this information for altitude switch. For example,
NASA developed a fly-by-wire fixed-wing aircraft for the first time [162].
NASA Ames Research Center has also developed a software testing
platform for testing the aircraft control software a few years ago [163].
Static and dynamic analyses are popularly used in software vulnera-
bility detection. Static analysis is a set of program analysis methods to
check and verify the properties of the program code without the need to
execute it [164]. Dynamic taint analysis is a technique that aims to
analyze the marked information flow when the program is executed, and
this method could detect most of the software vulnerabilities [165].
Some Well-known automotive manufacturers (e.g. Toyota [166], Hyun-
dai [167]) and airplane companies (e.g., Boeing [168]) use static, and
dynamic analysis of software behavior in safety-critical missions to fix
the bugs. There are several common techniques of static analysis,
including lexical analysis [169], control-flow analysis [109,111,170],
and data flow analysis [112,171]. The main advantage of static analysis
is that it does not execute the code, so it has fast execution and high
efficiency. In contrast to static analysis, dynamic analysis depends on
running the program to examine whether it has errors and vulnerabil-
ities. The two important dynamic analysis techniques are fuzzing [114,
172] and dynamic taint analysis [115,116,173]. Apart from static anal-
ysis and dynamic analysis, software testing techniques such as symbolic
execution [163] and mutation testing [174] can be used for software
vulnerability detection. For instance, symbolic execution has been used
for testing the altitude switch used in the flight control software [163].
In addition, machine learning, especially deep learning, has been
employed to automatically detect software vulnerabilities [118–122,122,
175,176]. For different methods, the key difference is feature selection.
For the software vulnerability predictionmodel, softwaremetrics that are
degrees of some properties that are relative to the software are used as
features to train machine-learning and deep-learning models. For a
software vulnerability-pattern-recognition system, features are extractedFig. 11. X b
16from the software source code using traditional static and dynamic pro-
gram analysis methods.
4.4. Malware detection
Malware detection is an important problem to be addressed in
intelligent vehicles because attackers usually use malware as a key tool to
launch campaigns. Even single incidences of malware can cause millions
of dollars loss [177]. Therefore, this malware should ideally be found and
stopped or at least expunged before it causes any loss.
Global computer security software companies such as McAfee
emphasize today’s connected cars’ vulnerability to malware [7]. When-
ever something new and as complex as an intelligent car or truck con-
nects to the Internet, it is exposed to the full force of malicious activities.
As depicted in Fig. 12, leaving an attack surface unprotected will expose
vehicles to many security risks, including malware and trojans. MSPMD
[123], Huda et al. [124], Huda et al. [125], and CloudIntell [126] are
among significant and well-known intelligent malware detection ap-
proaches, which can be used in vehicular networks. They are compared
with each other in Table 8. It demonstrates the key features and points of
the above-mentioned malware detection defences, and their merits and
demerits.
4.5. Comparision of existing security defence mechanisms
Security defences in intelligent vehicles are developed to protect the
in-vehicle communication and communication between vehicles. The
evaluation of a solution is required to know whether a particular solution
has achieved its aims or not. The evaluation will reveal the effectiveness
of security defences against malicious attacks. The challenge here is the
fact that security defences are developed under different deployment
configurations, which complicates the process of comparison. Herein, the
experimental overviews of the above-mentioned existing security de-
fences are compared with one another.
Generally, the challenges of the current main defence mechanisms are
as follows:y wire.
Fig. 12. Various types of malware attacks on intelligent vehicles.
Table 8
Malware detection defences.
Method Key idea Advantages Disadvantages
MSPMD
[123]


































































M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxx Cryptography: The main disadvantage of symmetric encryption is
the problem of key transportation. This problem is solved in asym-
metric encryption, and exchanging keys are not required. Thus,
asymmetric encryption reduces the overhead. Moreover, they can
provide undeniable digital signatures. However, public-key encryp-
tion is not fast enough, and it uses more computer resources. In the
same vein, the attribute-based encryption, as a suitable mechanism
for dynamic networks, is a type of public-key encryption with the
same drawbacks. Provided that, the key problem with presented
cryptographic methods is that they do not meet the performance
requirement of vehicles. In other words, vehicles need light and real-
time data transmission out of cities because of their fast-movement
nature. On the other hand, over any congested area of the city with
a traffic load of more than 100 vehicles in communication range,
storing and computation of encrypted messages are really challenging
[178].
 Network security: The main disadvantage of signature-based
detection mechanisms is that they cannot detect zero-day attacks.
In contrast, the anomaly-based detection methods have an advantage
over the signature-based methods for detecting unknown attacks, but17defining the rules is the main challenge of the anomaly-based
detection methods.
 Software vulnerability detection: Static analysis is usually time-
consuming, and finding trained professionals for dynamic testing is
difficult. Automated machine learning techniques mitigate the prob-
lem. However, machine learning techniques for software vulnera-
bility detection are not accurate enough, and more accurate defences
are required. In separate regard, since X-by-wire systems are highly
safety-critical, they must comply with safety standards such as ISO
26262. Moreover, software testing techniques must guarantee the
traceability of an artifact [179]. Thus, a more intelligent learning
defence for an accurate and precise software vulnerability detection is
of great importance.
 Malware detection: Although using machine learning techniques for
malware detection has improved the detection rate, it is still very
difficult to detect all evasive malware by traditional anti-malware
strategies, and more intelligent strategies are required.
The above-mentioned security solutions have been proposed to
mitigate malicious attacks and increase the security of vehicles. Table 9
associates identified attacks with the defence mechanisms. It is apparent
from this table that cryptographic and intrusion detection techniques are
recognized as well-known and popular defence mechanisms for pro-
tecting intelligent vehicles while not enough attention has been paid to
M. Dibaei et al. Digital Communications and Networks xxx (xxxx) xxxother defences such as software vulnerability detection. As mentioned
above in this section, software sizes in intelligent vehicles are growing
dramatically, and therefore software vulnerability detection, and mal-
ware detection techniques for protecting software in vehicles require
particular attention. In general, a specific defence mechanism is not
adequate. For instance, the DoS attack on CAN bus is very different from
the Dos attack on wireless vehicular communications. Therefore, a sys-
tematic approach that integrates complementary defence mechanisms is
needed. Cryptographic approaches are usually employed for protecting
wireless communications between RSUs and vehicles in inter-vehicle
communications. Network security techniques are appropriate for pro-
tecting ECUs as well as intrusion detection in wireless communications.
Software vulnerability detection techniques are suitable for the testing
and analysis of software before installation on the vehicle, while malware
detection techniques protect them against malware after installation.
Future research on securing intelligent vehicles against attacks should
consider recent technologies and developments. The next section will
focus on using lightweight authentication to improve cryptography, LTE
advanced, 5G and software-defined security to improve network security,
and deep learning to improve software vulnerability and malware
detection. In fact, computational constraints and the requirement for
real-time data transmission in intelligent vehicles are the main reasons
for choosing lightweight authentication as a future direction. Besides,
LTE advanced and 5G as new promising telecommunication standards for
V2E security and software-defined security as an efficient, adaptable, and
dynamic method for detecting and mitigating security attacks are other
main directions for future studies. Finally, deep learning techniques are
introduced because they outperform machine learning solutions in terms
of attack detection accuracy. Therefore, we will consider these de-
velopments as future directions.
5. Future directions
The research to date in the field of securing vehicles against cyber-
security challenges has addressed a number of security issues and pro-
posed many security solutions. However, there are still open challenges
that need further investigation. Future studies on the current topic are
therefore recommended. This section provides a discussion of open issues
as well as available and possible methods and technologies to further
secure, intelligent vehicles. This part of the paper aims to provide future
directions for research and encourage future contributions. In this sec-
tion, we outline four promising directions to further secure, intelligent
vehicle systems: lightweight authentication to improve cryptography,
LTE, and software-defined security to improve network security and deep
learning to improve software vulnerability and malware detection.
Our main reasons for choosing these directions for future research are
as follows:
 Lightweight authentication: In modern inter-vehicle communica-
tions, the efficiency of authentication has become a central issue
because fast-moving vehicles need to authenticate each other as
quickly as possible before exchanging any information. Thus, we will
introduce lightweight authentication as the first future direction.
 3GPP: Resulting from the development of V2E communications,
3GPP Cellular-V2X (C–V2X) as an initial standard completed in early
2017 to provide reliable, scalable, and robust wireless communica-
tions for hazardous situations. With this in mind, C–V2X is the first
step towards 5G and this area of study has been chosen for its role in
the development of network security in the future.
 Software-defined security: Software-defined security is the auto-
mation of threat detection and the automatic mitigation of attacks.
Therefore, SDS is a practical way of improving network security in
vehicular networks. In general, design principles of vehicular soft-
ware-defined networking is an open issue for future research.
 Deep learning: More recent attention has focused on using intelli-
gent deep learning technologies in different applications such as self-18driving vehicles. Deep learning methods are accurate. They outper-
form not only machine learning technologies but also humans in
many tasks. Future studies on utilizing neural networks in software
vulnerability detection, as well as mitigating malware attacks on
vehicles, are therefore recommended.5.1. Lightweight authentication
Achieving lightweight authentication is never a trivial task in intel-
ligent vehicle systems. The reason is that the authentication in the sys-
tems should be secure and efficient, and it should be flexible to handle
complicated transportation circumstances [180]. As a future research
direction, more attention should be paid to lightweight authenticated key
generation protocols using communication-media signals.
In this part of the paper, two types of lightweight authentication
protocols, including key establishment protocols using the keyless cryp-
tography technology and key distribution protocols using the Li-Fi
technology, are reviewed.
5.1.1. Key establishment using keyless cryptography technology
Alpern and Schneider designed a key-establishment protocol in
Ref. [181] using the keyless cryptography technology, and it was
improved by Refs. [182–184]. In these protocols, the characteristics of
the anonymous channel are utilized to establish secret keys. In the field of
communication theory, the broadcast channel can be turned into the
anonymous channel if the channel achieves source indistinguishability.
Technically, source indistinguishability requires that the adversary
cannot obtain a non-negligible advantage in identifying the source of the
signals (transmitted over the channel) even using sophisticated
signal-processing technologies.
5.1.2. Key distribution using light-fidelity technology
The rapid increase of wireless data communication makes the radio
spectrum below 10 GHz insufficient. Thus, researchers respond to this
challenge by utilizing the radio spectrum above 10 GHz. Light-Fidelity
(Li-Fi) provides a promising perspective: it is demonstrated that Li-Fi
can achieve high-speed wireless communication, at over 3 Gb/s, from a
single LED (which uses the optimized DCO-OFDM modulation) [185,
186].
In recent years, there is an increasing interest in designing intelligent
vehicle systems using Li-Fi technology. The related work includes
[187–190]. However, the research is in its infancy, and more in-
vestigations need to be conducted. Specifically, it is critical and imper-
ative to design key-distribution protocols using Li-Fi technology in order
to ensure the security of Li-Fi communication in intelligent vehicle
systems.
5.2. 3GPP on V2E security
3GPP is assigned to create technical specification services for LTE
support of V2E (3GPP TS33.185 V15.0.0 (2018-06)) [191]. The 3GPP
V2E standard will develop specifications for all aspects of LTE advanced
and 5G networks, including the protocols’ architecture, V2V, V2I,
Vehicle to Network (V2N), Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P) and all related
security concepts for all V2E models (Fig. 13). An overview of the LTE
enhancements is presented in Ref. [191] with an emphasis on the
transport of V2E messages. This document also identifies some of the key
threats to security in V2E networks as well as proposed mitigation
methods. In addition, some preliminary security requirements are iden-
tified to enable safe and secure communication in V2E networks.
Akeyelement inV2Ecommunication is the ability for vehicles andRSUs
to effectively and efficiently communicate. The 3GPP group outlines PC5 as
the primary communication protocol used between two autonomous cars.
In order to facilitate communication between the vehicle and the RSU, a
protocol calledUu is used. The vehicle toRSU-server is carried over LTE-Uu
Fig. 13. V2E models.
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important. In order for vehicles and users to be safe, effective, and efficient
exchange of information between vehicles must be achieved. Constant
communication and message exchange must be conducted in real-time.
Since vehicles are constantly evaluating their environment and their posi-
tions, real-time communication is important [191].
Most V2E research is based on the LTE standard. This technology is
currently being utilized and has been proven to be effective, with
excellent performance, high bandwidth, and low latency (up to 5 ms). 5G
is the V2E enabling technology, and it provides ultra-low latency (as low
as 1 ms). This allows a real-time response, which enables real-time
warnings to be distributed to autonomous vehicles to avoid collisions
in real-time. This is key to ensuring that autonomous vehicles provide
safe and reliable transport for their users. The end-to-end latency that is
required for all real-time V2E transmissions is less than 5 ms for message
sizes of about 1600 bytes with a probability of 99.999%. This require-
ment must be guaranteed for all data traffic in real-time V2E communi-
cations [192].
Handover in and out of 5G coverage is illustrated in Fig. 14. It is an
important aspect of supporting the V2E application with multiple Radio
Access Technology (RAT) modems [193]. The User Equipments (UEs) are
grouped into platoons (clusters) as they move through the network.
Platoon-related messages must be transmitted between UEs with very
low latency as per requirement. Thus, V2V messages needed to support
platooning applications are exchanged between the UEs in the target cell
using device-to-device communication in 5G New RAT (NR), even
though there is no 5G coverage in the target cell [193]. In Ref. [193],
intersection safety and provisioning for urban driving are discussed.
Future applications lead to reduced traffic congestion as traffic is routed
according to traffic incidents and conditions. A Local Dynamic Map
(LDM) is used to express traffic signal information, and pedestrian and
vehicle movement, direction, and location information. 3GPP utilizes the
low latency capability of 5G communications to conduct real-time anal-
ysis of traffic conditions to reduce congestion. The concept of intersection
safety information system is illustrated in Fig. 15.193GPP is proposing a car Electronic Control Unit (ECU), which is a
software module able to control the car’s system electronics. Examples
are wheel steering and brakes. The ECU has to be periodically software
updatable. ECU software updates are very important for V2E and have to
undergo major security testing.
5.3. Software-defined security
Software-defined security refers to the automation of threat detec-
tion, and automatic mitigation of threats using software-defined plat-
forms by adopting an open flow protocol, Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) which
utilizes the concept of a multi-layered open virtual switch with pro-
grammatic extension to enable automation on a large scale, in addition to
the open stack standard as a platform to manage the cloud and distrib-
uted data centers.
Current systems take an unacceptably long time to recover from DDoS
attacks because they require IT personal intervention to reconfigure
major nodes settings and cannot be utilized in a V2E environment. The
most promising solution is to automate the network configuration by
applying SDN, which uses a central point of control and a decoupling
control plan from the data plan to automate the configuration and set-
tings for major nodes. Based on SDN, we can apply the concept of SDS,
which would decouple the mitigation plan, from the detection plan to
automate the security action and solution to mitigate attacks and threats
to any node or component within the V2E system. The SDS has to allow
legitimate traffic to pass through to the designated destination and the
redirection of traffic with an abnormal signature to submit to a forensic
analysis to extract as much as possible information about the attack
characteristics and traffic parameters in order to create a patch file to
mitigate the attack by pushing down the patch file along with the
network major nodes and devices. Dynamically changing environments
of V2E will require dynamic software and hardware for practical
implementation. SDNs are a key piece of the V2E architecture, enabling
dynamic mitigation of security threats on the V2E network.
Fig. 14. Use case out of 5G coverage.
Fig. 15. Concept of intersection safety information system.
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Deep learning models and techniques such as Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Deep Belief Net-
works (DBN), Deep Boltzmann Machines (DBM), MultiLayer Perceptron
(MLP), autoencoder-based methods, and sparse coding-based methods
are based on training neural networks with a training set. After training
the neural network, it recognizes the patterns and classifies a different set
of examples called a test set [194]. In deep-learning models, there are
many layers between the input and output layers for finding features.205.4.1. Real-time simulation and formal verification
In a separate regard, the industry is adopting real-time simulation
and formal verification as part of a security compliance check for
intelligent vehicles [76,195,196]. In real-time simulation, computer
models are used to accurately re-create repetitive and flexible test
environment for vehicular systems [197] while formal verification
provides security guarantee [198,199]. As a promising future direction,
deep learning-based models can be combined with real-time simulation
and formal verification to provide more rigid yet accurate security
assurance.
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As illustrated earlier, one of the main drawbacks of deep learning
approaches is computational complexity. Due to more datasets, cloud
computing is a convenient solution for deep learning approaches. How-
ever, a major problem with this kind of application is huge data traffic
and latency. In general, therefore, it seems that the distribution of
computation between nodes is a better idea. With this intention, in recent
years, edge computing or fog computing for the IoT has been introduced
[200]. The term “fog computing” was used by Cisco the first time and
generally understood to mean extending cloud computing to the edge of
the network. It should be noted that low latency, geographical distribu-
tion, real-time interaction, support of mobility, and wireless access are
the most significant characteristics of fog computing networks [201].
In particular, exchanging safety-critical information in the IoV and its
supporting platform [202] between connected vehicles and RSUs need to
minimize latency. With this in mind, mobile edge computing provides an
important opportunity for deep learning applications to extend the con-
nected car cloud to be close to vehicles without sending data to distant
servers [203].5.5. Summarizing future directions
With the emerging and developing IoT and IoV, the biggest challenge
for intelligent vehicles in the future is security. By comparing the pro-
posed directions for future security solutions, it is obvious that they are
usually light, fast, and intelligent. Therefore, they provide an appropriate
environment for developing more adaptable and complicated security
defences with high performance, meeting security requirements in the
vehicles.
6. Validity discussion
In any study of this report, the validity of the results is always under
threat. As a matter of fact, it is possible that some limitations may have
influenced this review paper. Herein, some of these limitations and
threats have been discussed:
 Limitation of the approach: Due to brevity, we only selected a few
interesting and major security attacks. The scope of attacks is no-
where close to being exhaustive. But we hope the solutions for these
attacks can provide generalizable solutions for other attacks that are
not covered here.
 Solutions covered: Once again, our solutions chosen are nowhere
exhaustive, but we have chosen them based on our research capa-
bilities from all possible collaborations for the manuscript. We hope
the solutions, though inevitably limited, can provide some research
insight into securing the intelligent vehicle systems.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an overview of securing state-of-the-art
intelligent vehicles. Firstly, we focused on security issues and stated
the security requirements of intelligent vehicular networks. We also
presented a number of security attacks on intelligent vehicle systems
and challenges related to them. Secondly, we studied the security
defences and classified them into four categories regarding their
effectiveness against these identified attacks. Finally, we comprehen-
sively reviewed and discussed the potential directions for the future to
secure intelligent vehicle systems and their communications. Since the
security problems regarding intelligent vehicles have raised increasing
concerns among academia and industry, we hope this work can pro-
vide a good foundation for researchers interested in gaining insight
into intelligent vehicles’ security issues and working on the proposed
solutions.21Funding
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